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Abstract: This paper provides evidence consistent with elite capture of Social Fund 
investment projects in Ecuador. Exploiting a unique combination of data-sets on village-
level income distributions, Social Fund project administration, and province-level 
electoral results, we test a simple model of project choice when local political power is 
unequally distributed. In accordance with the predictions of the model, poorer villages are 
more likely to receive projects that provide excludable (private) goods to the poor, such 
as latrines. Controlling for poverty, more unequal communities are less likely to receive 
such projects. Consistent with the hypothesis of elite capture, these results are sensitive to 
the specific measure of inequality used in the empirical analysis, and are strongest for 
expenditure shares at the top of the distribution. 
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1.  Introduction 
Should resource allocation decisions of anti-poverty programs be taken at the 
local level, or should they remain centralized? Two recent trends combine to underscore 
the relevance of this question. First, a growing number of developing countries have 
made poverty reduction an explicit development objective, and many have made real 
policy efforts towards that objective. Second, decentralization of spending authority to 
local governments has become common practice in a number of countries. In addition, a 
whole new breed of anti-poverty programs in developing countries are introduced from 
the outset as highly-decentralized, demand-driven initiatives, where decisions on the type 
of expenditures and investments are meant to be made by the local beneficiaries 
themselves, in a participatory manner.
2 
Yet, the theoretical literature remains ambiguous in its assessment of the rationale 
for decentralization. The ambiguity arises from the trade-off between the local 
government’s advantage in terms of access to superior information at lower cost, and the 
possibility that the risk of capture of decision-making by special interest groups is higher 
at the local level than at the national level. This possibility is the so-called “Madisonian 
presumption” that “the lower the level of government, the greater is the extent of capture 
by vested interests, and the less protected minorities and the poor tend to be.” (Bardhan 
and Mookherjee, 2000, p.135)
3 
Theoretical models have identified a number of factors that may lead to greater 
capture at the local level (such as greater levels of voter ignorance, or the greater 
cohesiveness of local interest groups), and others that may lead to greater capture at the 
center (such as higher costs for detecting and punishing bureaucratic corruption at the 
central level). The unavoidable conclusion has been that: “the contrasting roles of these 
diverse factors suggest that the extent of relative capture at the local level may well turn 
out to be context- and system-specific. This creates the need for empirical research to 
                                                 
2 These so-called Community Driven Development (CDD) programs have become a major form of 
development assistance. For an excellent review of the community-based and community-driven 
development programs, see Mansuri and Rao, 2004.  They note that the World Bank alone lent $2 billion 
dollars to CDDs in 2003. 
3 In addition to the contributions by Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000, 2005), see also Dasgupta and Kanbur 
(2001) and Platteau (2004).    3 
identify the nature of relative capture in any given setting, in order to appraise the 
potential pitfalls of decentralization.” (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000, p.139). 
Quantitative empirical evidence of elite capture of specific decentralized 
programs certainly exists, but it is not particularly abundant. Galasso and Ravallion 
(2005) find that the targeting performance of the Food for Education program in 
Bangladesh is worse in communities where land inequality is greater, and argue that this 
reflects greater capture of the benefits by the elite when the poor are less powerful. 
Examining India, Rosenzweig and Foster (2003) show that increases in the population 
weight of the poor result in increases in the likelihood of receiving pro-poor projects 
(such as roads) in villages with elected panchayats, but not in villages with more 
traditional leadership structures, suggesting that local democracy matters for whether or 
not decentralization benefits the poor. 
There are two principal reasons why empirical studies of elite capture of 
decentralized programs remain rare. The first reason is that income, consumption or 
wealth data that are representative at the level of disaggregation required for studying 
program incidence within villages are extremely rare. Most household surveys are not 
representative at that level. The second reason is that a key mechanism for capture is 
influence over the type of expenditure to be financed from available resources – and this 
raises the difficult question of defining what types of projects benefit the poor more than 
others.  
In this paper, we use a unique combination of data-sets from Ecuador to 
investigate whether there is any evidence consistent with elite capture in the pattern of 
project choice by communities that were awarded Social Investment Fund grants. Our 
data include reliable poverty and inequality estimates at the community level, obtained by 
combining high-quality information from a household survey with Census data. They 
also include administrative data on project approvals and expenditures by type and by 
community, for a period of almost three years. Finally, to account for relative capture vis-
à-vis the central government, we also use province-level data on the results of the 
presidential election that predate the period under consideration. 
Identifying elite capture in the context of Social Funds has proved hard because 
the Funds typically provide beneficiary communities with a menu of projects to choose   4 
from, most of which provide public goods, and all of which are intended to benefit the 
poor. In this paper, we exploit the fact that the menu offered by the Ecuadorian Social 
Fund – which we describe in more detail in the next section – included basically two 
types of projects: local public goods (whose valuation may vary across individuals, but 
which are accessible to all) and excludable (private) goods. By far the most important 
private goods (in project numbers) provided were latrines, which were built in land plots 
belonging to community members with no previous access to toilet facilities. These 
individuals tended to be highly concentrated among the poorest, and were almost never 
among the richest members of the community, who might be identified with the elite.  
We propose a simple model of project choice between public and private goods, 
under the assumption that political power is positively correlated with socio-economic 
status (proxied by per capita household expenditures). The model predicts that, 
controlling for inequality, poorer communities would select latrine projects (the 
excludable projects mostly needed by the poor) more often than better-off ones. It also 
predicts that, controlling for poverty, more unequal communities would choose latrine 
projects less often, as a result of a concentration of power in the hands of richer people, 
who do not need new latrines. To the extent that such a choice reflects differences in 
power, rather than need, it constitutes capture of the program.  
Econometric analysis of project choice between 1993 and 1996 reveals a pattern 
that is consistent with the predictions of our model. Controlling for poverty, various 
measures of access to services, and a number of geographic and demographic variables, 
communities with greater inequality chose pro-poor excludable (latrine) projects 
significantly less often. Consistent both with the notion of “elite capture” and with the 
fact that complete access to toilet facilities is only observed at the top of the income 
distribution, these results are strongest for inequality measured as the expenditure share 
of the top 1%, 3% or 5% of households. This effect becomes smaller and less significant 
as our definition of the elite is expanded and completely disappears if the expenditure 
share of the rich is replaced by the Gini index. The results are also remarkably similar 
under two different econometric specifications. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly review the 
literature on Social Funds, and describe Ecuador’s Fondo de Inversión Social de   5 
Emergencia (FISE). The nature of this Social Fund informs the structure of our model of 
project choice, which is presented in Section 3. Section 4 describes the data sets used in 
the analysis, with emphasis on the administrative FISE project monitoring and 
information data, and on the community-level estimates of poverty and inequality.   
Section 5 presents our empirical results, and section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Social Funds and Ecuador’s FISE 
Social funds are (usually administratively autonomous) agencies that finance 
small sub-projects in several sectors - such as education, health, water, and sanitation - in 
response to demands articulated by local groups and screened against a set of eligibility 
criteria. They were set up in many countries in the 1980s and 1990s, initially as 
temporary measures to mitigate the social costs of structural adjustment programs but, 
with time, many have acquired a more permanent character. They operate as second-tier 
agencies that appraise, finance, and supervise implementation of social investments 
identified and executed by a wide range of actors, including local governments, NGOs, 
local offices of line ministries and community groups (White, 2002). Funds channeled 
through these agencies are not insubstantial.
4  
In addition to accounting for increasingly large development flows, a number of 
studies suggest that most Social Fund projects are (mildly) pro-poor, and that they deliver 
projects to rural (and nowadays urban) areas which lack basic infrastructure.
5 Beneficiary 
assessments often indicate that the projects are a top priority for the community.
6  Social 
Funds have also drawn praise for their lean and efficient operation, which usually stands 
in stark contrast to the performance of line ministries in many developing and middle-
income countries.  
                                                 
4 Over the last decade, the World Bank alone has financed close to $5 billion through Social Funds, in over 
120 projects in almost 60 countries (van Domelen, 2002).  
5 The literature evaluating Social Funds has grown rapidly in recent years.  Important contributions include 
Chase (2002) on Armenia; Chase and Sherbourne Benz (2001) on Zambia; Newman et al. (2002) on 
Bolivia; Paxson and Schady (2002) and Schady (2000) on Peru;  Pradhan and Rawlings (2002) on 
Nicaragua;  and Rao and Ibáñez (2005) on Jamaica. World Bank (2003) provides a multi-country analysis. 
6 Although, Platteau and Gaspart (2003) argue that villagers may not express their reservations about the 
financed project or the role of the elite, for fear of losing the funds.  For the poor (or the non-elite), any 
public investment in the community might be better than nothing, even if it is not what they would have 
ideally wanted.   6 
A defining principal of most – if not all – Social Funds is their decentralized and 
participatory decision-making process. At the central level, the agency administering the 
Fund typically designs a menu of projects which communities can apply for. This menu 
is then presented to selected communities, which are expected to choose one or more 
projects in some (typically ill-defined) participatory manner.
7 The process by which the 
decision is reached is neither pre-determined, nor usually very well-documented. 
Nevertheless, a number of qualitative studies have suggested that the process of project 
choice at the village level is not devoid of politics, and does generally reflect differences 
in local power and influence.  
Often, an NGO, a local government agency, or a “prime mover”, such as a village 
headman or a school teacher, acts as an intermediary between the community and the 
Social Fund.  De Haan, Holland, and Kanji (2002) suggest that these people or 
organizations are not mere intermediaries.  In many instances, these prime movers decide 
what project will be chosen before any community meeting ever takes place and 
subsequently inform the community of their choice (and often on how the villagers can 
contribute). Such local political processes can affect the incidence of Social Fund 
expenditures within the targeted communities, and thus impinge upon their effectiveness 
to reduce poverty. For example, White (2002) points out that since the ‘prime mover’ is 
very often a headmaster/teacher (or a health worker) there is a disproportionate number 
of schools (or clinics) amongst Social Funds projects.
8   
Ecuador’s Social Fund, FISE, was created in March 1993 with the aim of 
compensating the poor for reductions in overall public spending that had been 
implemented as part of a macroeconomic adjustment program intended to lower inflation. 
FISE was created with resources from international organizations (U.S. Agency for 
International Development, Inter-American Development Bank, the Andean Finance 
Corporation, and the World Bank) matched by local funds. It was administered by a 
national agency under the direct supervision of the President, and had a board of 
                                                 
7 Communities are typically selected to receive a visit from the Social Fund on the basis of some poverty 
ranking, with the poorest communities being targeted first. 
8 From this last perspective, the presence of some kind of local “elite” might be needed for an application to 
actually become formulated. Bardhan & Mukherjee (2000), Khwaja (2002), and Dayton-Johnson & 
Bardhan (2002) suggest the possibility of a non-linear effect of income inequality: while some 
differentiation across community members might be helpful, too much inequality may hamper cooperation.    7 
managers with representatives of various ministries, including Social Welfare, Education, 
Health, Labor, Finance, Agriculture, and Information. 
FISE financed small projects that were managed and implemented by local 
governments and civil society organizations. The resources could be used for five project 
categories: social infrastructure (including construction of schools, health clinics, day 
care centers, latrines, and equipment for such facilities), socio-economic infrastructure 
(including water supply, sewerage, road rehabilitation, and irrigation), social services 
(including health, nutrition, and hygiene interventions, teacher training, etc.) institutional 
development (providing support to community operations and maintenance committees), 
and productive community investments (financing for group activities in agriculture, 
livestock, fishing, etc.).
9 However, they could not finance the operational budgets of 
implementing organizations. Appendix Figure 1 shows the location of all FISE projects 
disbursed between May 1993 and January 1996 – which constitutes our project-level data 
set – on a map of Ecuador. Each subdivision in the map corresponds to one canton (or 
district), and the three shaded areas denote the main geographic regions of the country: 
the Coast, the Sierra, and the Oriente (Eastern Region). Cantons in which parroquias 
received latrine projects are shaded black, and in which parroquias received other 
projects (but no latrines) are dotted. 
Before approaching the communities, FISE established central targets for the 
share of the budget that should be spent on different types of projects (at the aggregate 
level).
10 In addition, it adopted geographic targeting criteria, by allocating proportionally 
more resources to communities with higher numbers of poor individuals. These 
geographical poverty targets were established for aggregate resource transfers, and did 
not specify project types for each individual locality. For the selection of project type, 
FISE employed a participatory, demand-driven approach. Regional offices organized 
meetings with community organizations and local government representatives to promote 
the program and to explain the guidelines for project application. In these sessions, FISE 
officials described the different types of projects for which resources were available, 
provided reference costs for each type, and explained the process through which 
                                                 
9 See World Bank, 1994 for more detail on the sub-project categories. 
10 The term community is henceforth used as a synonym of – and interchangeably with –  parroquia 
(“parish”), the smallest administrative unit in Ecuador.   8 
communities could apply for funds to implement one or more projects. Unfortunately, 
there are no records of what the specific processes of project selection were at the 
community level. 
Once FISE approved a project, an executing agency or contractor was chosen and 
a representative from the community was appointed to ensure that the contract was 
honored during project execution.
11 The projects that FISE financed represented a 
transfer of resources to local communities that were generally very poor, at no fiscal cost 
to the recipients. Since communities did not have the administrative resources to apply 
for projects in all possible categories (and since this would in any case have been 
discouraged by FISE representatives), it stands to reason that the decision of what type of 
project to apply for would be taken seriously by community members. In the next section, 
we propose a simple “pivotal voter” model of project choice for a social fund such as 
Ecuador’s FISE.  
 
3.  A Simple Model 
This section presents a simple model of project choice in communities where 
there is wealth inequality, and where local power is related to wealth. We consider a 
situation in which communities can choose between a public good project and a private 
good project, and where the private good is a basic necessity.
12 
Consider an economy, the rural sector of which consists of J communities (or 
villages), indexed by j = 1,…, J. Agents who live in these communities are indexed by i 
j i∈  = 1,…,Ij. Agents are ex-ante identical in every respect, except for their initial 
wealth level, wi. Each village is therefore characterized by its own wealth distribution 
function,  () w Fj . 
There are three goods in this economy. The first is a perfectly divisible private 
consumption good c, which is taken as the numeraire. We think of this composite good as 
including the basic necessities of life in a developing country, such as food and clothing. 
                                                 
11 This community representative was granted a power of attorney by the community for whom he was 
acting as an agent. 
12 This approach is appropriate for modeling Social Funds, because these agencies typically offer 
communities project menus, which mostly consist of local public goods projects (like schools and health 
clinics), and some private goods projects for what are considered basic necessities - such as latrines.   9 
The second good, x, is a lumpy private good. It is consumed in discrete units, at price 
p>1. We think of it as an excludable good that may require considerable investment to 
purchase or produce, such as a latrine, a house, a roof or a refrigerator.  Finally, there is a 
(local) public good g, such as a village school, a health clinic, or a road. Even if g is 
technically excludable and rivalrous in consumption (such as a classroom), we assume 
local institutions are such that the good is treated as a local public good.  
Agents are endowed with initial wealth level wi, and with a unit of labor (li = 1), 
which they supply inelastically. This is a simple rural economy, in which all production 
(of the numeraire good c) takes place through a common-knowledge production function: 
 
() 0 , 0 , , , < > = ww w l i i i f f f w l f y        ( 1 )  
 
The production function is assumed to be atomistic: no production pooling is 
possible across agents. We also assume an extreme form of credit market failure: no 
credit markets exist at all. For simplicity, we assume that x and g are produced in a 
separate sector of the economy (possibly the “urban” sector) and traded, but the results 
would carry through if x were produced using an individual’s own labor and wealth, 
provided its lumpy character were preserved. The rural sector is a small player in the 
market for x, so its price is taken as given. Because of its local public good nature, we 
assume that g can only be produced by the government, and some amount gj is 
exogenously provided to village j prior to the launch of the Social Fund. 
Agents maximize an objective function given by: 
   ( ) j i i g x c U , ,           ( 2 )  
subject to  i i i y px c ≤ + . 
The utility function in (2) is weakly increasing and concave in all arguments, and 
is additively separable, so that  g x c U U U xg cg cx , , , 0 ∀ = = = . It satisfies the Inada 
conditions on all three goods but, with respect to good x, it also satisfies: 
   () p g c U x ≥ , 0 ,  (from the Inada condition)  and  () 0 , 1 , = g c U x .     (3) 
  The conditions in (3) imply that there is a unit individual demand for x. An 
individual who does not own a unit of x wants to purchase it, but any additional unit after   10 
the first one has no value. We argue that, in a poor rural setting, this is broadly consistent 
with its chosen depiction of a house, latrine or refrigerator. 
 
Pre-Social Fund Equilibrium 
Under these assumptions, an equilibrium of this rural economy is fully described 
by its income distribution and consumption profile. Let Gj(y) denote the unique income 
distribution function in village j, which is deterministically derived from the application 
of individual endowments (labor and wealth) to production function (1). 
The consumption profile is as follows: 
ci = yi    ;     xi = 0  and  gij = gj    i f   y yi
~ <    (4) 
ci = yi - p  ;   xi = 1  and  gij = gj    i f   y yi
~ ≥  
where  {} 1 ) , ( inf ~ = = y p x y y  denotes the lowest level of income at which agents 
start demanding one unit of good x. Without making additional assumptions about the 
utility function, we do not know the exact value of  y ~, but we do know that 
∞ < ≤ < y p ~ 0 , for any utility function satisfying the properties of (2) – in particular the 
Inada conditions and (3). 
The implication is that the poorest section of the population – a proportion  () y G j
~  
in village j – does not consume good x (the latrine, or refrigerator).
13  x is only consumed 
by people richer than  y ~.  Everyone in village j has access to the exogenously given level 
of local public good gj. 
 
The Social Fund and the Politics of Project Choice 
Now suppose that a social fund is created with the explicit objective of reducing 
deprivation in this rural economy, by making in-kind transfers of goods x and g (which 
are produced elsewhere) to specific communities. In keeping with the participatory 
                                                 
13 In our empirical analysis, we use latrines to stand for good x.  Table 1 shows that, in our data, it is 
primarily poor people who have no toilet facilities. The richer a household is, the higher is its likelihood of 
having access to private toilet facilities of some kind.  Other evaluations of Social Funds from Latin 
America show that latrine projects are the most progressive option on the menu of many Social Funds (see, 
e.g., Pradhan and Rawlings, 2002).   11 
design of Ecuador’s FISE, suppose the communities themselves must decide what project 
they prefer to receive. 
Specifically, suppose each community j must choose one of two possible projects: 
j i∈ ∀ : 1 π , i receives one unit of x; or 
: 2 π  j receives an increment of public good of  j g ∆ . 
  Social preferences over these two project options depend on how large  j g ∆  is, 
and it is useful to distinguish two cases
14: 
Case (I):  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) g c g c U g g c U g c U g c U j j j j j , , , 0 , , 0 , , 0 , , 1 , ∀ − ∆ + ≤ −  (5) 
Case (II):  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) g c g c U g g c U g c U g c U j j j j j , , , 0 , , 0 , , 0 , , 1 , ∀ − ∆ + > −  
Given individual preferences and the resulting pre-Social Fund consumption 
profile described by (4), it can be shown that, in both cases, the preference profile in each 
community satisfies the single-crossing condition of Gans and Smart (1996), which is 
sufficient for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium.
15  
 
Proposition 1. In both cases I and II, the preference profile over the project set 
{} 2 1,π π = Π  satisfies the single-crossing condition.  
Proof: see Appendix. 
 
Proposition 1 ensures the existence of a majority voting equilibrium over project 
types in these villages. But how should we model the political process of project choice 
in the context of a social fund? Although “community participation” and “decentralized 
decision-making” were buzzwords frequently found in the documents that launched FISE 
in Ecuador in 1993 – and indeed in most other Social Funds – it is harder to find a 
description of the exact decision-making procedures that communities were supposed to 
                                                 
14 Additive separability of the utility function allows us to define Cases I and II for any level of c, gj. 
15 Since the relevant social choice is over a discrete set  {} 2 1,π π = Π , it is convenient to use Rothstein’s 
(1990) order restriction as a sufficient condition for the existence of majority rule. In the proof of 
Proposition 1, we appeal to the fact that preferences that satisfy order restriction must also satisfy single-
crossing, as shown by Gans and Smart (1996). This approach is more appropriate for the discrete voting 
problem we consider than relying on the monotonicity (in incomes) of marginal rates of substitution 
between x and g, or any of the alternative characterizations of single-crossing proposed by Gans and Smart 
(1996).   12 
follow in applying for a project. Local NGOs were often involved, and village or town 
assemblies are known to have taken place. In all cases, a full proposal had to be written 
and submitted to a Comite de Aprobaciones (Selection Committee). It is not clear 
whether an explicit vote was taken on a number of proposals within each village, or what 
alternative mechanism existed to make these choices. 
Bearing this in mind, we model the political process at the community level in a 
reduced-form manner that allows us to rely on the existence of the majority voting 
equilibrium (from Proposition 1), but which also allows for the existence of inequalities 
in political power among community members. Let each agent i be endowed with 













. yij is the 
individual’s own income and µj denotes the mean income in the village. εij is a zero-mean 
random variable, distributed according to H(ε)  in  [] ε ε , , independently from income, 
which is meant to capture idiosyncratic determinants of influence, such as personality. 
Only three conditions are imposed on influence functions:   














;   













; and  






































The influence function simply postulates a link between relative income levels and 
political power. Since influence over village affairs is an internal village matter, it is 
natural to think that it depends on relative, rather than absolute income levels: if 
everyone’s incomes double, relative political power remains unchanged. Condition (i) 
imposes that there is no such thing as negative influence. Condition (ii) assumes that the 
relationship with relative incomes is non-decreasing throughout (though idiosyncratic 
factors are allowed through the term εij). Condition (iii) normalizes influence so that it 
sums to one over the entire community. Under these three conditions, majority rule is 
modified only in that the decisive voter is no longer the median voter, but the expected   13 












































Project selection and the local distributions of income and influence 
Given the political process outlined above, village decisions on whether to apply 
for project π1 or π2 hinge on which case of Equation (5) applies, and then on whether or 
not  y y ~ *≥ . As shown in the proof to Proposition 1, under Case I, project  2 π  is chosen 
unanimously. It is natural to interpret Case I as one in which village need for public good 
gj is very high. Perhaps there is no school at all, or no roads through which to transport 
produce to nearby markets. If need for gj is so great that even those without latrines (or 
refrigerators) prefer an increment in the level of the local public good than to get access 
to a unit of x, then there is unanimous support for the local public good project.  
Under Case II, the utility gain (to those individuals who do not yet own a unit of 
x) from project  1 π  - which provides an additional unit of good x to each individual – is 
greater than the gain from project  2 π  - which provides a given increment in the supply of 
the local public good,  j g ∆ .
17 But we know from the pre-social fund equilibrium that this 
is the case only for those individuals with  y yi
~ < . Those with incomes  y yi
~ ≥  already 
own a unit of x, and always prefer  2 π . Project preferences therefore differ on ‘class’ 
lines, with the poorest agents in j supporting project π1, and the richest agents supporting 
π2.  In this case, since the expected pivotal voter is at percentile  () * * y G p = , the decision 
hinges on the relationship between the economic threshold  y ~ and the political threshold, 
y*. If  y y ~ *≥ , π2 is chosen. π1 is chosen otherwise. 
                                                 
16 See Bénabou (2000) and Ferreira (2001) for earlier applications of the pivotal voter model, and its 
consistency with modified “median-voter type” results when preferences satisfy the single-crossing 
condition. This framework provides a simple alternative to the probabilistic voting model used, e.g., by 
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005), which is better suited to modeling the election of a local government than 
to the selection of project types. 
17 Case II corresponds to situations in which the endowment of the local public good gj is not so low, and 
those without lumpy private goods (e.g. latrines) gain a greater welfare improvement from a unit of the 
latter than from the proposed expansion in schools, health clinics or roads.   14 
Since Case II is the one in which there is no consensus, it is clearly the one of 
interest for a study of the politics of project choice. If we restrict attention to this case, 
and define a poverty line of  y ~, it is possible to make two specific and testable predictions 
about the relationship between village poverty and inequality levels on the one hand, and 
project choice on the other.
 18   
 
Proposition 2: In case (II) of equation (5), for a given influence function and for a 
given village Lorenz curve, a greater incidence of poverty leads to a greater probability 
that project π1 is chosen.    
Proof: see Appendix. 
 
Proposition 3: In case (II) of equation (5), for a given influence function and 
controlling for poverty incidence, an increase in inequality due to regressive income 
transfers from poor to non-poor agents reduces the probability that project π1 is chosen.  
Proof: see Appendix. 
 
The intuition for these results is straight-forward. Proposition 2 states that, since 
people with incomes lower than the threshold level  y ~ prefer project π1 (e.g. latrines), the 
probability that this project type is selected, everything else constant, rises in G( y ~), 
which is the poverty incidence. An increase in the population mass below  y ~, keeping 
relative incomes (i.e. the Lorenz curve) and the influence function v(y/µ) constant, causes 
cumulative political power to reach the 50% threshold at a lower income level than 
before.  Appendix Figure 2 illustrates such a movement from density function g0(y) to 
g1(y). In this case, since the new pivotal voter is at income level y*1 <  y ~, project π1 is 
now chosen instead of π2. 
                                                 
18 In this economy, it seems natural to treat  y ~  as the poverty line. Economists from Adam Smith to 
Amartya Sen have defended a view of poverty as the inability to consume goods (or enjoy functionings) 
widely regarded as basic necessities in their community. In this model,  y ~  is exactly such a threshold. In 
what follows, we treat it as the poverty line, although qualitatively similar results would hold for any 
poverty line  y z ~ ≤ .   15 
A similar logic accounts for the result in Proposition 3. For a given population 
mass below  y ~, an income transfer from those below that threshold to those above it 
increases income inequality but also transfers political power from the poor to the non-
poor. Since the poor prefer π1 and the non-poor prefer π2, this transfer of political power – 
in expectation, or, alternatively, for a given H (ε)) – shifts the political equilibrium from a 
choice of project π1 to a choice of project π2. Appendix Figure 3 illustrates such a shift 
from density function g0(y) to g1(y), which raises the income level of the expected pivotal 
voter from y*0 to y*1. 
Proposition 2 leads to the testable prediction that, controlling for local inequality, 
villages with a greater incidence of poverty should receive x-good (latrine) projects more 
often than those where poverty is lower. Proposition 3 suggests that, controlling for the 
incidence of poverty, villages with higher inequality levels should receive x-good projects 
less often.  
 
Qualifying Remarks 
  Before we take these predictions to the data, three final observations about the 
model are in order. First, Proposition 2 was stated and proved for a poverty line that 
coincides with the income threshold below which pre-social fund consumption of the x-
good was zero ( y z ~ = ) . We argued that it made intuitive sense to choose that threshold 
as a poverty line, but the result in Proposition 2 would carry through for the case  y z ~ ≤ , 
provided the increase in G(z) came at the expense of density mass above  y ~. Such an 
increase in the incidence of poverty would still result in an increase in political support 
for π1, as before. 
Second, it should be noted that not all increases in inequality are predicted to 
reduce the probability that project π1 is chosen. Only increases in inequality resulting 
from regressive transfers across  y ~ would have that effect, since they increase the power 
of π2 supporters, at the expense of π1 supporters. This suggests that we may not expect all 
measures of inequality to conform to the prediction of the model. If  y ~ is a fairly high 
income level – which is plausible given the numbers of people with no access to toilet 
facilities in the data (see Table 1) – then a generic measure of inequality, such as the Gini   16 
coefficient, may not be suitable to test this proposition. In that case, only transfers of 
income from the “poor” to the very rich would be predicted to reduce the probability of x-
good projects. 
Finally, in many social funds, including Ecuador’s FISE, communities were 
permitted to apply for more than one project. In our framework, this corresponds to 
adding a third project type:  
j i∈ ∀ : 3 π  receives one unit of x and  j receives an increment of public good of  j g ∆ . 
With these three projects, and given the pre-Social Fund consumption profile in 
(4), it is clear that  2 1 3 π π π i i P P  for i:  y yi
~ < , and  1 2 3 π π π i i P I  for i:  y yi
~ ≥ , where P (I) 
denotes the strict preference (indifference) of individual i (as in the proof of Proposition 
1). It is easy to check that Rothstein’s order restriction condition is still satisfied in all 
pairwise comparisons across all elements in  {} 3 2 1 , , π π π = Π . The key consideration for 
our results is the indifference of non-poor voters ( y yi
~ ≥ ) between π2 and π3. If the 
pivotal voter were non-poor, it would be enough to introduce any infinitesimal additional 
cost – such as a greater supervision cost – to him or her of choosing π3 over π2, to induce 
him to choose  π2. In that case, both a greater incidence of poverty and progressive 
transfers across  y ~ would be associated with observing π3 : multiple projects that include 
x-good (latrine) projects. Lower poverty and greater inequality (due to regressive 
transfers across  y ~) would lead us to observe public good projects π2, but no latrine 
projects. 
We are now in a position to take the predictions of this simple model to the data, 
which refers to Ecuador’s Social Fund in the period from 1993 to 1996. The next section 
describes our data sets, and the empirical results are discussed in Section 5. 
 
4.  The Data Sets. 
Project-Level Data 
The Ecuador FISE project included the introduction of a computer-based 
management and information system (MIS) that was intended to assist with monitoring of 
the project cycle and the overall performance of the project.  The MIS provides   17 
information on the type, number and location of projects; key dates (of application, 
approval and completion); size of FISE transfer; amount of community-level counterpart 
funding (if any); and the name of implementing agency (contractor, NGO, the community 
itself, etc.).
19  MIS data covering all projects that were applied for between May 1993 and 
January 1996 - and that were granted - serve as our source of project-level information.  
Information is available on a total of 2,876 projects. As foreshadowed in the previous 
section, the MIS data reveal that many parroquias applied for and were granted more 
than one FISE project. An important limitation of the data set is that MIS did not keep 
records of unsuccessful applications.  
For the purposes of this study, the key variables of interest are the type of project 
chosen by each community, and the name and location of the beneficiary community.  
Table 2 documents the percentage breakdown of projects across types.  Just over a third 
of projects (34%) comprise the acquisition of school equipment and materials.
20 Another 
32% of projects involved new construction of school rooms or school buildings. While 
projects supplying school equipment involved the delivery of goods in kind, construction 
projects involved transfers of funds which were used to finance contractors for the 
construction work. 
A third, sizeable, category of projects comprises construction of latrines (13% of 
all projects).  These projects are of central importance to the analysis in this paper, since 
they embody the two main properties of the x-good projects (π1) discussed in Section 3.  
First, latrines are used largely by the poor in rural Ecuador (see Table 1).  Evidence from 
household surveys indicates that non-poor households are far more likely to use other 
forms of sanitation infrastructure – such as toilets with connections to a networked water 
supply, or septic tanks. Second, the latrines constructed by the FISE were intended as 
private goods delivered to households with no previous sanitation infrastructure.  Project 
documents indicate that beneficiary households obtaining such latrines had to provide the 
                                                 
19 Unfortunately, the project funding data seems to be unreliable for use in our empirical analysis.  For 
example, for projects with in-kind transfers, such as equipment and materials, the funding is usually entered 
as ‘zero’ in the MIS database.  Furthermore, sometimes the total amount of funding the community or the 
applicant received seems to have been entered under one project line and the rest of the projects again 
register ‘zeros’.  For this reason, we refrain from using MIS funding amounts data in our analysis. 
20 FISE project documents indicate that equipment included such items as blackboards and desks, but the 
school equipment and materials projects explicitly did not allow for the acquisition of school books.   18 
land on which the latrine was constructed.  Each beneficiary household received a latrine, 
and these were intended for the household’s exclusive use.
21   
The empirical analysis below takes as unit of observation all parroquias in rural 
Ecuador. Our main variable of interest takes on three different values depending on 
whether a parroquia received no project, at least one latrine project, or at least one FISE 
project but no latrine projects. We seek to assess to what extent the value taken by this 
indicator variable is affected by community-level characteristics, such as poverty and 
inequality. 
 
Poverty and Inequality Estimates at the Community Level 
Poverty and inequality rates were estimated at the level of each parroquia on the 
basis of a methodology that is described in detail in Elbers, Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2002, 
2003).  We estimate poverty based on a household per-capita measure of consumption 
expenditure, yi. A model of yi is estimated using 1994 household survey data (INEC’s 
Encuesta Sobre Las Condiciones de Vida - ECV), with the set of explanatory variables 
restricted to those that are also found in, and strictly comparable to, the population census 
of 1990.  We regress log per-capita consumption expenditure for household i on a set of 
household-level demographic, occupational and educational variables, as well as census 
variables calculated at the level of the census-tract or other level of aggregation above the 
household level: 
 
ln yi = xiβ + ui,            ( 6 )  
where β  is a vector of k parameters and ui is a disturbance term satisfying E[ui|xi] 
= 0.  The model in (6) is estimated using the survey data.  We then use these estimates to 
calculate the welfare of an area or group in the population census. Letting W represent an 
indicator of poverty or inequality, we estimate the expected level of W given the 
observable characteristics in the population census, and the parameter estimates from (6). 
We denote this expectation as: 
 
                                                 
21   A separate category of FISE projects – designated “public toilets” – are more readily seen as public 
goods, and are kept separate from the latrines category in Table 1.  These represent around 4% of all FISE 
projects.   19 
µ j = E[W | Xj, ξ  ],          ( 7 )  
where Xj  is a matrix of observable characteristics in community j and ξ  is the 
vector of model parameters, including those that describe the distribution of the 
disturbances. 
In constructing an estimator of µ j we replace the unknown vector ξ  with 
consistent estimators, ξˆ , from the survey-based consumption regression.  This yields 
j µ ˆ . This expectation is generally analytically intractable so we use simulation to obtain 
our estimator,  j µ ~ . 
The first-stage estimation is carried out using the ECV 1994 household survey, 
which is stratified at the regional level, as well as for rural and urban areas. Within each 
region there are further levels of stratification, and also clustering. At the final level, a 
small number of households (a cluster) are randomly selected from a census enumeration 
area. 
Our empirical model of household consumption allows for an intra-cluster 
correlation in the disturbances (see Elbers, Lanjouw and Lanjouw, 2002, 2003 for more 
details).  Failing to take account of spatial correlation in the disturbances would result in 
underestimated standard errors. We estimate different models for each region and we 
include in our specification census mean variables and other aggregate level variables in 
order to capture latent cluster-level effects.  All regressions are estimated with household 
weights.  We also model heteroskedasticity in the household-specific part of the residual, 
limiting the number of explanatory variables to be cautious about overfitting. We 
approximate both the cluster and household-level disturbances as either a normal 
distribution or a t-distribution with varying degrees of freedom.
22 Before proceeding to 
simulation, the estimated variance-covariance matrix is used to obtain GLS estimates of 
the first-stage parameters and their variance.   
The estimates of poverty and inequality produced for Ecuador based on the above 
methodology have been described in greater detail in Demombynes et al (2004) and 
                                                 
22 Rather than drawing from parametric distributions in our simulations, we can also employ a semi-
parametric approach by drawing from observed residuals in the first stage model.  Our results have 
generally been found to be quite robust to the choice of parametric or semi-parametric draws.   20 
Elbers et al (2004).
23  These studies document that, in Ecuador, there is a considerable 
amount of heterogeneity across parroquias, in terms of both poverty and inequality.  At 
the aggregate level, rural poverty rates are generally highest in the Eastern (Amazon) 
region.  However, at the local level, pockets of very high poverty are also discernable in 
the central, mountainous, Sierra region and along the Coast.  Elbers et al (2004) note that 
inequality levels vary markedly across parroquias, and emphasize that there should be no 
presumption that inequality levels are somehow lower in poorer communities. 
 
Additional Control Variables 
In addition to the community-level poverty and inequality estimates that are of 
primary interest in our investigation of the determinants of project choice, we include a 
number of control variables intended to capture the influence of other factors affecting 
project choice. From the 1990 census data, we calculate population figures at both the 
province and the parroquia level. The Census also allows us to calculate the percentage 
of the population in each parroquia that is of indigenous ethnic origin (based on language 
spoken).  These demographic characteristics could be thought to influence project choice 
in a variety of ways, and in the case of population are also important to the assessment of 
whether the FISE program is well targeted at poor communities.  Project documents note 
explicitly that the targeting of FISE funding was to be based on a combination of 
measured poverty and population of provinces (although the targeting was based on an 
ad-hoc map of poverty entirely unrelated to the poverty map outlined above). A simple 
correlation between presence of a FISE project and incidence of poverty at the parroquia 
level finds no significant association – suggesting very poor targeting. However, once the 
parroquia population is controlled for, the association becomes positive and strongly 
significant.
24  As was found by Paxson and Schady (2002) for the case of the 
FONCODES Social Fund in Peru, geographic targeting of Ecuador’s FISE project 
                                                 
23 A question of some importance to this study is whether the poverty map estimates should be seen to 
correspond the year 1990 (the year of the census) or 1994 (the year of the household survey).  Hentschel et 
al (1999) argue that because the period between 1990 and 1994 was essentially one of economic stagnation 
it is not unreasonable to assume that the relationship observed between consumption in 1994 and household 
characteristics in that year was essentially unchanged from the relationship that held in 1990.  As a result, 
one can view the poverty map as a reasonable snapshot of the spatial distribution of poverty in both years.  
For further discussion of these issues see also Elbers et al (2005). 
24 This evidence on targeting of FISE is also discussed in the next section and illustrated in Figures 3 & 4.   21 
appears to have been rather good, in the sense of targeting those regions with large 
populations of poor people.  
Census data are also exploited to construct proxies for different types of 
infrastructure “need” at the level of each parroquia, namely the percentage of households 
in each community that have no access to any toilet facilities, the percentage of 
households with access to piped water supply, and the percentage of children (5-12 year 
olds) enrolled at school.
25  
Following Schady (2000), we acknowledge the possible effect of electoral 
considerations by the party in office at the central government level on the distribution of 
FISE expenditures. As with Social Funds in many countries, the FISE was an 
independent agency set up in parallel to established ministries of the government and, in 
Ecuador, it was essentially run out of the President’s office.  It certainly is conceivable 
that a project such as FISE might be used by the Presidency for purposes other than the 
official objectives of the project – characterizing capture at the central, rather than local, 
level. To account for this possibility, we examine province-level results from the second 
round of the 1992 presidential elections, as published by the Tribunal Supremo Electoral 
Ecuatoriano, the agency overseeing the electoral process in Ecuador. This election was 
the last national election prior to the creation of FISE, and the Social Fund was in fact 
launched during the administration of PUR (Partido Unidad Republicana), which won 
that election.  We calculate the share of votes obtained by the incumbent party (the PUR) 
in each province. The higher this percentage, the more inclined the central government 
might be to “reward” the province with FISE funding of some kind.
26 Descriptive 
                                                 
25 Additional control variables capture geographic differences. The first is the distance of each parroquia 
from Quito, the capital of Ecuador and seat of the central government. This variable was computed as a 
linear distance (in kilometers), using the geographic coordinates of the parroquias. It is an imperfect 
estimate of proximity, as it does not measure actual travel time between two locations. Data on geographic 
coordinates was obtained from the Sistema Integrado de Indicadores Sociales del Ecuador, SIISE and it did 
not include all of the parroquias of Ecuador. For locations for which no geographic coordinates were 
available, we imputed those of the closest parroquia, based on visual inspection of a map. A second 
geographic variable takes the value of 1 if the parroquia is the administrative capital of the canton it is in.  
Such parroquias are plausibly more closely connected to the government than others. 
26  A second electoral variable that was calculated was the absolute deviation of the presidential vote in a 
particular province from 50%. This measure aims to capture the “non-marginality” of a particular province 
from a political point of view.  As argued by Dixit and Londregan, (1996), the central government might 
wish to influence voting behavior in “swing” provinces – provinces in which either its majority is 
precarious, or it is not far from gaining a majority – through strategic allocations of FISE resources.  The 
more “non-marginal” a province, on the basis of this argument, the less likely the province would receive a   22 
statistics for all variables introduced in this section, and used in the empirical analysis 
that follows, are presented in Table 3. 
 
5.  Estimation and Results. 
The two key results from the model of project choice presented in Section 3 were 
that: (i) controlling for the influence function (i.e. for idiosyncrasies in each community’s 
decision-making process) and for inequality, poorer communities would be more likely to 
choose latrine projects; and (ii) controlling for the influence function and poverty 
incidence, more unequal communities would be less likely to choose latrine projects. 
Figures 1 and 2 show that the conditional patterns observed in the data conform to these 
predictions. Using a partial linear regression, Figure 1 plots the probability that a 
community has received a latrine project on the incidence of poverty (linearly controlling 
for the expenditure share of the top 1%) and shows a steady increase in that probability 
for the most part.
27 
Using a similar partial linear regression, Figure 2 presents the probability that the 
community has received a latrine project on our preferred measure of inequality (or elite 
dominance), namely the share of the richest 1% of the population in total consumption 
expenditure, this time (linearly) controlling for the headcount index. As that “expenditure 
share” rises (from 5% to 14%), the probability that the community chooses a latrine 
project falls from around 35% to around 5%. Both of these regressions are run over the 
sample of communities that received at least one FISE project over the period of analysis.  
While these conditional correlations are consistent with the predictions of our 
model, they might be spurious due to other omitted variables. Table 4 therefore presents a 
multivariate analysis of the relationship between project choice on the one hand, and 
poverty and inequality on the other, where we are able to control for a number of other 
likely determinants of project receipt. The specification reported in Table 4 is a 
multinomial probit with three choice categories: (1) no FISE project at all; (2) at least one 
                                                                                                                                                 
FISE allocation. This variable was originally included in the regressions reported in the next section, but 
proved insignificant in all of them and was subsequently dropped. 
27 The downward turn at the high end of the distribution is due to several very small parroquias (all in the 
Oriente region) that have no latrine projects, but some other type of FISE project.  It is possible that in such 
small communities in the sparsely populated Oriente, the need for latrines is not as high as in other 
communities.   23 
FISE latrine project; (3) some FISE projects, but none involving latrine construction. 
Table 4 reports the multinomial probit coefficients with respect to the omitted category 
(1), i.e. no FISE projects.
28  
As the poverty concept that is relevant to our model of project choice is poverty 
incidence – G( y ~) – we use the headcount index as our poverty measure in Table 4. Since 
income inequality is proxying for the power of the elite, we use the expenditure share of 
the top p% of the population, where p varies from 1 to 20 in different specifications.
29 
Additional controls include parroquia population, indigenous share of the population, 
share of the votes in the province where the parroquia is located which went to the 
winner of the last presidential election (1992), three measures related to project need in 
water, sanitation, and education, province population, distance to Quito, whether or not 
the  parroquia is the seat of the canton government, and regional dummies. These 
variables were discussed in the previous section, and descriptive statistics for each are 
presented in Table 3.  
After controlling for inequality (and all the other controls), poverty is a positive 
and significant determinant of the probability of receiving both categories of projects, 
vis-à-vis receiving none – a result which is likely to reflect spatial poverty targeting by 
FISE, as well as greater need. The relevant result for our model is the difference between 
the poverty coefficients in the latrine and other project columns, for each regression 
model. These are shown in Table 5. 
Inequality negatively (and significantly) affects the chances of receiving a latrine 
project (vis-à-vis none), when measured by the expenditure share of the richest 1%. In 
terms of our model, however, the relevant test is whether the difference between the 
                                                 
28 A multinomial probit is a natural specification for the community’s problem of choosing whether to 
apply for no project at all, to include a latrine project on its application, or to apply only for non-latrine 
projects. These are discrete choices with more than two outcomes that do not have a natural ordering.  
Since some communities – the identity of which is not made public - are screened out by the FISE spatial 
poverty targeting, one might also consider an alternative in which there is first a selection stage into FISE, 
and subsequently a second stage of project selection. We therefore also estimate a probit model with 
selection (presented below under the robustness tests sub-section), and the results are remarkably similar.  
29 The reader familiar with small area estimation techniques described in the previous section may wonder 
how precise the estimates of the expenditure share of the top 1% are. While the estimates of the expenditure 
share of the top 1% are noisier than, say those of top 5% or 10%, they are reasonably precise. The average 
ratio of standard error to point estimate for the parroquias in our sample is 0.14 for the expenditure share of 
the top 1%, 0.08 for that of top 5%, and a quite precise 0.05 for that of top 10%. In any case, noisy 
measures of inequality would lead to attenuation bias, making the results presented in this section appear 
weaker than they actually are.   24 
inequality coefficients in the latrine and other project columns is negative and significant. 
That test is reported in the last column of the table. The difference is negative in all five 
cases – suggesting that greater inequality does lower the probability of receiving a latrine 
project, as compared to receiving other projects – and is significant at the 10% level when 
inequality is measured by the expenditure shares of the top 1%, 3% or 5%.
30 
Interestingly, the size (and significance) of these coefficients fall as we enlarge the size of 
the top group, whose expenditure share we use as our measure of inequality. In terms of 
our model, this suggests either a high income threshold ( y ~), a very convex influence 
function (one in which decisions about project choice are very heavily influenced by a 
few dominant actors in each community
31), or both.  
Among the remaining independent variables, parroquia population is strongly 
positive and significant, which we interpret as reflecting the nature of the spatial targeting 
undertaken by FISE, which selected the communities to which project menus would be 
offered by the number of poor people they would affect. Figures 3 and 4 show the 
bivariate relationship between the probability of receiving any FISE project and poverty, 
measured by the headcount index and by the number of poor people respectively. Both 
are estimated as non-parametric regressions, so that the linearity of the second 
relationship is revealing. The indigenous share of the population is also positively and 
significantly associated with an increase in latrine projects (as compared to no projects), 
even after controlling for poverty and inequality.  
In Table 4, we examined the results with villages receiving no projects as the 
reference category. Table 5 presents results from the exact same model, but with “other 
projects” as the reference category. Coefficients are shown only for the category of 
latrine projects. It can now be seen that poverty incidence is associated with a statistically 
significant increase in the probability of getting latrine projects, rather than other types of 
projects, in three of the six specifications (and the p-values are at or just above 0.10 for 
the other three specifications). Since it relates to differences across project types, this 
result is less likely to be driven by FISE targeting and more likely to reflect the project 
                                                 
30 The reader might also note that the p-value of the coefficient for the expenditure share of top 10% is 
0.12. 
31 As noted in Section 2, this is consistent with the view that a few “prime movers” play a key role in 
selecting projects for application. (De Haan, 2002; White, 2002).    25 
selection process discussed in Section 3: other things equal, a greater population weight 
for the poor translates into greater political voice for them in choosing the projects they 
favor. This effect is not negligible:  all else equal, a community with a headcount index of 
0.77 is almost four times more likely to receive a latrine project than a community with a 
poverty incidence of 0.37.
32 
As illustrated in the previous table, inequality at the community level has a 
negative effect on the probability of receiving a latrine project compared with the receipt 
of other FISE projects. This effect (as well as its statistical significance) declines as our 
definition of the group of elite gets larger. The important role of inequality in project 
choice is the main result of the paper, and it is consistent with the model prediction that 
villages in which socioeconomic status (and therefore political power) is more highly 
concentrated are less likely to apply for and receive projects for an excludable good that 
is of value only to its poorer members. All else equal, the effect of moving from a 
parroquia at the 5
th percentile of the inequality distribution (i.e. the expenditure share of 
top 1% is equal to 5.6%) to one at the 95
th percentile (expenditure share equal to 9.6%) is 
a 10.6 percentage point decline in the likelihood of receiving a latrine project – from 
19.6% to 9.0%.  The decline is a much smaller 6.4 percentage points when the group of 
elite is defined to be those in the top 10% of the expenditure distribution. 
 It is interesting to note that the provincial share of the incumbent in the 1992 
presidential election is negatively (and significantly) related to the probability of 
receiving latrine projects, as compared to others. If, as previously suggested, one is 
prepared to treat this variable as indicating some degree of FISE capture at the central 
level – in the sense that funds are allocated to reward political support, rather than 
exclusively to reduce poverty – then it would appear that the evidence is consistent with 
capture at both levels. Central agents would seem to reward supportive provinces by 
awarding project grants that are preferred by the local elites. Since we did not model 
central grant allocation, we regard this piece of evidence as merely suggestive, but it does 
                                                 
32 The headcount index values of 0.37 and 0.77 represent the 5
th and the 95
th percentiles in the distribution 
of poverty across the rural parroquias in our sample.  The probability that a community with a headcount 
index of 0.37 (and with all other variables equal to the sample mean) is 7%, while the same probability is 
26% for the community with a headcount index of 0.77 (and, again, all other variables equal to the sample 
mean).   26 
raise interesting questions about the relative degree of capture between national 
politicians and local elites. 
 
Robustness Tests 
We conduct two kinds of tests for the robustness of the poverty and inequality 
results. The first set of tests consists of adding variables and making other specification 
changes in the multinomial probit reported in Table 5. These changes are reported in 
Table 6 which, analogously to Table 5, reports coefficients for the latrine project 
category, with other projects as the reference. In column I of Table 6, we replace the 
headcount index (FGT (0)) with the squared poverty gap index (FGT (2)). We would not 
expect this particular measure to be a better indicator than the headcount index, which 
corresponds more closely to the relevant concept from the model, G( y ~). But it is 
nonetheless reassuring to find that the coefficient on inequality remains significant under 
alternative poverty measures.  
An alternative interpretation for the negative impact of inequality on the 
likelihood of receiving latrine projects is that incomes are correlated with education, and 
it may be educational differences – rather than differences in power – that drive the 
result. While any reductions in the ability of the poor to make their voices heard or their 
project preferences known that arise from educational disparities would qualify as one 
kind of mechanism underlying the influence function discussed in Section 3, it turns out 
that income inequality remains significantly negative even after a measure of educational 
inequality is included. In Column II of Table 6, we use the share of the population with 
post-secondary education as an (inverse) measure of educational inequality. This measure 
is not significant, but the expenditure share of the richest 1% retains its sign and 
statistical significance. The results are also robust to including the expenditure share of 
the “middle class” (percentiles 60 – 99 or 60 - 95), but not when the elite is defined as the 
richest 10% (columns III to V). 
The second robustness test is to replace the multinomial probit specification of 
project choice with a probit model with selection, estimated by maximum likelihood. 
Such a specification might be preferred if one thinks of the FISE grant allocation process 
as consisting of two clearly demarcated stages: first a set of communities is selected to   27 
receive grants, and only then do these communities choose the types of projects they wish 
to receive. The information available in the FISE program documents suggests that 
selection processes were not that clear-cut. There were villages to which no menu was 
offered, on the grounds of having too few poor people. There also appear to have been 
villages that were eligible for the program, but from which no applications were 
received.
33 We therefore prefer the multinomial probit specification, where a hierarchical 
structure of selection is not imposed, and the three possible outcomes are not ranked.  
Be that as it may, it turns out that the key poverty and inequality results are 
remarkably robust to the alternative, Heckman probit specification. Table 7 shows the 
selection probit equation and five alternative specifications for the main equation. The 
variable excluded from the main equation is the proportion of people in the province that 
voted for the incumbent.
34 As before, the incidence of poverty is positive and significant 
in both the selection equation (likely due to spatial poverty targeting from the center) and 
in the main equation, consistent with the model prediction.
35 The expenditure share of the 
elite (or inequality) variable also remains negative and statistically significant (for the top 
1%, 3% or 5% of the population), with the coefficients remarkably similar to those from 
the multinomial probit estimation. Interestingly, inequality is not significant in the 
selection equation, suggesting that the effect of inequality really bears on the choice of 





                                                 
33 Although, unfortunately and as indicated in Section 4, the administrative FISE data set on which we draw 
does not include data on unsuccessful applications, or on communities visited by FISE teams from which 
no applications were received.  
34 Under a sequential view of the selection process, where communities are first identified to receive a 
project, and the type of project is chosen subsequently within the community, it makes sense to expect 
electoral variables at the central level to affect selection, but not to have any impact on the type of project a 
community applies for. 
35 Significance levels are, if anything, larger than in the multinomial probit specification. 
36 Several papers suggest that the relationship between local inequality, participation, and collective action 
is complex, and that while some inequality may be necessary to mobilize collective action, too much 
inequality may be harmful (see, for example, Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan 2002 and Khwaja 2002). In 
Appendix Figure 4, we present evidence reminiscent of this literature when we allow for a more flexible 
(non-linear) relationship between inequality and probability of project receipt. Conditional on various 
community characteristics, the likelihood that a community receives a FISE project increases initially with 
inequality, then declines.   28 
6.  Conclusions 
The recent literature on decentralization of anti-poverty programs in developing 
countries has highlighted the need for quantitative empirical analysis of specific 
programs, with particular attention to any evidence relating to whether programs might 
be diverted from their original mandate, as a result of the influence of local elites. In this 
paper, we have analyzed a unique combination of data sets from the Ecuadorian Social 
Investment Fund (FISE), during 1993-1996. The combination of a detailed, parish-level 
poverty map, full program administrative data on project implementation, and province-
level electoral results has allowed us to investigate the relationship between local income 
distribution and project choice in an unprecedented way.  
To help our understanding of the role played by elites in community-level 
decision-making, we presented a simple model of project choice between local public 
goods and excludable goods that are particularly demanded by the poor. The model was 
designed specifically for this case study, where a key distinction among a menu of 
projects - all of which may appear to be pro-poor - was between projects that would 
benefit the entire community (through increased provision of local public goods, such as 
schooling, health clinics or roads), and those that provided excludable private goods that 
the poor were in great need of, but which brought no direct benefit to the elite.
37 The 
main examples of such private goods were latrines, and latrine construction projects 
accounted for 13% of all FISE projects.  
Under the assumption that influence over local decision-making processes is a 
non-decreasing function of income, the model generates two basic predictions: other 
things equal, latrine projects would be more frequently found in poorer villages, and in 
less unequal villages. Inequality would reduce the probability that a community received 
latrine projects, controlling for poverty and need, through an “elite capture” mechanism: 
decision-making power would be more concentrated in the hands of those to whom 
additional latrines would be of no use, reducing the chances that they would be provided. 
Both predictions are borne out empirically. Controlling for infrastructure need and 
a set of geographic and demographic variables, the poverty headcount is associated with a 
                                                 
37 We acknowledge that building latrines for the poor may have positive health externalities for the non-
poor.  Whether the elite take this effect into consideration during the decision-making process is uncertain.   29 
greater probability that the community receives a latrine project. With the same controls, 
inequality (measured by the expenditure share of the top 1%, 3%, 5%, etc. of the 
population) reduces the likelihood that latrine projects are chosen. This effect of 
inequality on project choice is smaller as we define the group of elite to be larger.  The 
results are robust to empirically modeling project choice as a one-shot process (through a 
multinomial probit) or as a sequential, two-stage process (through a probit with 
selection). They are also robust to including an indicator of education inequality; to 
measuring poverty with an alternative FGT measure; and to the inclusion of some 
measures of middle-class clout. 
These results are consistent with our simple model of project choice under 
political inequality. We interpret them as providing support to the hypothesis that even 
programs which are targeted to the poor, and which only offer projects from a menu that 
is designed with poverty-reduction in mind, are vulnerable to capture by local elites. 
While channeling funds away from latrine construction towards school-building may not 
appear as a grave distortion, the point is that elites are capable of affecting the outcomes 
of participatory processes, even when they are reasonably carefully designed. In their 
essence, these results are similar to those found by Galasso and Ravallion (2005) for the 
Food for Education program in Bangladesh, where greater land inequality was associated 
with worse targeting outcomes.  
As evidence of this kind mounts, there may be implications for the design of 
hundreds of Social Funds and other community-driven development programs currently 
in operation or preparation around the developing world. These implications are not 
necessarily that such programs should be abolished or that they should be centrally 
administered. In fact, our empirical results suggest that capture at the center may also be 
occurring. In the case of Ecuador’s FISE, one may be tempted to think of laying down 
clearer rules for the manner in which decisions must be taken within each community, 
with a view to making it harder for the more powerful to exercise an unduly large amount 
of influence.
38  
                                                 
38 This is also related to the Rosenzweig and Foster (2003) result that the provision of pro-poor local public 
goods increases with poverty in Indian villages, but only when effective local democracy (elected 
panchayats) is in place.    30 
Appendix: Proofs of the Propositions in Section 2 
 
Proof of Proposition 1:  
 
In village j, order individuals  { } j I i ,..., 1 ∈  by their income levels yi. 
Order  { } 0 ; , 1 1 = ∆ ∈ ∀ = ∆ = j i g j i x π  and  { } j j i g g j i x ∆ = ∆ ∈ ∀ = ∆ = ; , 0 2 π  by their first 
elements. We thus have a set of voters that is a chain, with the order ≥ defined over yi , 
and a chain of social alternatives  {} 2 1,π π = Π ,  where  2 1 π π > .  Denote the weak 
preference relation of individual i with income yi, of project a over project b as  b i aRπ π , 
whose asymmetric factor (strict preference) is denoted  b i aPπ π . Indifference is denoted  
b i aI π π . 
 
(i) Case I:  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) j j j j j g c U g g c U g c U g c U , 0 , , 0 , , 0 , , 1 , − ∆ + ≤ −  
Since x =1 if  y yi
~ ≥ ,  1 2 π π i P  for i:  y yi
~ ≥ . 
Since  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) j j j j j g c U g g c U g c U g c U , 0 , , 0 , , 0 , , 1 , − ∆ + ≤ − ;  1 2 π π i P  for i:  y yi
~ < .  So π2  
is  preferred unanimously, which is a trivial case of order restriction (OR). 
 
(ii) Case II:  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) j j j j j g c U g g c U g c U g c U , 0 , , 0 , , 0 , , 1 , − ∆ + > −  
Since x =1 if  y yi
~ ≥ ,  1 2 π π i P  for i:  y yi
~ ≥ . 
Since x = 0 if  y yi
~ <  and  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) j j j j j g c U g g c U g c U g c U , 0 , , 0 , , 0 , , 1 , − ∆ + > − ;  2 1 π π i P  
for i:  y yi
~ < .  
Then {} {} {} 2 1 1 2 1 2 : : : π π π π π π i i i i i i P y I y P y > > , where > is the strict set order defined by 
S > S’ if for all x ∈ S and z ∈  S’, x>z. But this is the condition for the preference profile 
to satisfy order restriction (OR). By theorem 3 in Gans and Smart (1996), a preference 
profile satisfies order restriction if and only if it satisfies Single Crossing (SC). QED. 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 2:  
































) , where this latter 
probability is defined over H(ε). Note that:  
(i) an increase in the incidence of poverty G( y ~) that leaves the Lorenz curve 
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It follows that an increase in G( y ~) is simply a transfer of probability mass from 
the second term in (iii) to the first. Thus  
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ij .  QED. 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 3:   
































) , where this latter 
probability is defined over H(ε).  














  Any income transfer from  y y i ij
~ : <  to  y y i j i
~ : ' ' > , with no change in the v(.) 





























, and thus lowers Prob ( 1 π is chosen). 
QED. 
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Appendix: Figures 
 









￿  33 
Appendix Figure 2: A Lorenz-preserving increase in poverty can lead to a shift in the 
political outcome towards the x-good project. 
 
 
Appendix Figure 3: A poverty neutral increase in inequality arising from income 
transfers from the poor to the non-poor can lead to a shift in the political outcome 
towards the g-good project. 
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The results are obtained using the PLREG (partial linear regression) command in STATA, linearly controlling for all 
the explanatory variables used in the selection equation of the probit with selection model (Table 7).  35 
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The results are obtained using the PLREG (partial linear regression) command in STATA, linearly controlling for the 
expenditure share of top 1%. 
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The results are obtained using the PLREG (partial linear regression) command in STATA, linearly controlling for the 
headcount index.   39 
Figure 3: Headcount Index and Probability of FISE Project Receipt 















































Figure 4: Number of Poor and Probability of FISE Project Receipt 
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Table 1: Access to toilets and latrines by quintiles of per capita household consumption 
quintile toilet  latrine  None 
Poorest quintile  44.5%  12.0%  43.4% 
2
nd   45.8%  15.4%  38.7% 
3
rd   51.1%  18.4%  30.5% 
4
th   56.7%  17.4%  25.9% 
Richest quintile  73.9%  9.7%  16.4% 
Richest 1%  98.1%  1.9%  0.0% 
 
Table 2:  Distribution of FISE Projects by Type, 1993-1996 
Type of project  Number of Projects  Share of projects 
School (infrastructure)  920  32 
School (equipment and 
materials) 
977 34 
Latrines 377  13 
Sewerage 132  5 
Water Supply  129  5 
Health 115  4 
Other 226  7 
TOTAL 2876  100 
* Other projects include road works, agro-industry, irrigation, and erosion, crafts, adult training centers, statues, murals 
and public laundries. 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean  Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
% of parroquias with at least one FISE project  65  100  48 
% of parroquias with at least one latrine project (out of 
539 parroquias with projects)  28 0 45 
Province  population  546,354 364,682 621,020 
Parroquia  population  4,185 2,856 4,118 
Distance to Quito (in kilometers)  244  212  178 
% of parroquias that are canton capitals  11  0  31 
% speaking indigenous language at home  8.4  0.7  19 
% voted for incumbent in presidential elections (PUR2)  56  57  11 
% with no access to any toilet facilities  58.1  59.8  23.5 
% with access to piped water  35.2  32.4  26.1 
% of 5-12 year-olds enrolled in school  76.9  78.5  9.8 
Headcount  index  0.58 0.59 0.12 
Expenditure share of top 1% (%)  7.1  6.7  1.7 
Expenditure share of top 3% (%)  14.8  14.4  1.9 
Expenditure share of top 5% (%)  20.8  20.3  2.2 
Expenditure share of top 10% (%)  32.3  31.8  2.7 
Expenditure share of top 20% (%)  48.8  48.3  2.8 
Gini Index  0.39  0.39  0.037 
These statistics are based on 835 rural parroquias in Ecuador.  539 parroquias have at least one FISE project while 236 
have none.   41 
Table 4: Determinants of receiving latrine projects or other projects  
  Regression model I  Regression model II  Regression model III  Regression model IV  Regression model V 
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-15.03 
(0.07) 
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(0.12) 
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Observations  835 835 835 835 835  
Results are obtained using the “mprobit” command in Stata to implement a multinomial probit.  In each regression model, having received ‘no project’ is the base outcome.  P-values are in parentheses.  In 
the last column, the p-values in parentheses refer to a chi-square test for top’i’ [latrine] = top’i’ [other], where i = 1, 3, 5, 10, or 20.  The test statistics for the equality of coefficients for all the variables 
presented in this table can be seen in Table 2.  The regression models also include (not reported here) regional controls, province population, distance to Quito, and a dummy variable for whether the 
parroquia is a canton capital or not. 
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Table 5: Determinants of receiving at least one latrine project vs. other projects 















% speaking an 
indigenous 













% who voted for 














% with no access 














% with access to 













% of children 5-12 




























of top 1% 
-14.99 
(0.07)       
Expenditure share 
of top 3%   
-11.21 
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-8.17 
(0.09)    
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Observations  835 835 835 835 835 835 
Results are obtained using the “mprobit” command in Stata to implement a multinomial probit.  The base outcome is 
the parroquia receiving ‘no latrine project, but other projects’.  The regression models also include (not reported here) 
regional controls, province population, distance to Quito, and a dummy variable for whether the parroquia is a canton 
capital or not.  P-values are in parentheses.   43 
Table 6: Are the results robust to the inclusion of other variables? 
 I  II  III  IV  V 
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4.37 
(0.11)      
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% of individuals with post-
secondary education   
-3.60 
(0.13)      
Expenditure share of  60-99 
percentile    
2.86 
(0.57)    
Expenditure share of top 
5%      
-7.97 
(0.11)  
Expenditure share of  60-95 
percentile      
9.27 
(0.20)  
Expenditure share of top 
10%      
-3.71 
(0.38) 
Expenditure share of  60-90 














Observations  835 835 835 835 835 
Results are obtained using the “mprobit” command in Stata to implement a multinomial probit.  The base outcome is the 
parroquia receiving ‘no latrine project, but other projects’.  The regression models also include (not reported here) regional 
controls, province population, distance to Quito, and a dummy variable for whether the parroquia is a canton capital or not.  
P-values are in parentheses.   44 
Table 7: Determinants of receiving at least one latrine project  
(Probit with selection) 
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Observations  835  540 540 540 540 540 
LR test of independent 











Results are obtained using the “heckprob” command in Stata to implement a probit model with selection.  Selection equation 
refers to the 1
st-stage model (of whether a community receives any Social Fund project or not) and main equation refers to 
the 2
nd-stage model (of receipt of at least one latrine project by the community).  Percentage of individuals who voted for the 
incumbent in 1992 is used as exclusion restrictions in the selection model.  It is significant at the 5% level in all five 
regression models presented here.  The regression models also include (not reported here) regional controls, province 
population, distance to Quito, and a dummy variable for whether the parroquia is a canton capital or not.  P-values are in 
parentheses. 
 
 